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Commentaries on the Law. Sir William Blackstone. (Ed. by Ber-
nard C. Gavit). Washington Law Book Co. 1941. Pp. xx, 1040.
$6.00.
The first volume of the Commentaries of Blackstone was published
in 1765; the three remaining volumes had appeared by 1769. The at-
tacks upon the book began immediately, the mental approach of the
writer and the philosophy evinced in his treatment of the subject meet-
ing severe criticism.
Moreover, certain defects and omissions in the work were made evi-
dent. The subjects of domestic relations and criminal law were scant-
ily treated; the responsibility of masters for the wrongful acts of serv-
ants and the liability of infants for their acts were meagerly explained;
embezzlement and false pretence were not considered; larceny and for-
gery were not fully discussed; only "ways" were treated under ease-
ments; fixtures were ignored; and the law of landlord and tenant and
bailments were not sufficiently expressed.
However, by 1780 the book had passed through eight editions. Since
then there have been more than twenty. And now a new one is offered
to the public. Until about thirty years ago this book was studied by
practically every candidate for a law license. In more than a century
and a half no book has taken its place, and no modern legal system .has
anything to compare with it.
It follows the work has great merits; and chief among these are a
remarkable clearness, grace and elegance of style at once lucid, precise
and comprehensive joined to an orderly and logical development of
legal topics which unfolds the subject under discussion to a fascinated
reader like a great drama.
About 1892 William Hardcastle Brown published his edition of
Blackstone without notes, except those necessary to indicate that a law
had been abrogated, materially altered, or had become obsolete. As in
most of the later editions, much that was without bearing on the pres-
ent law or the principles which underlie it was eliminated, and the work
appeared in one volume. The most striking change was the restate-
ment of the text in modern language and condensed form (which causes
wonder at the persistent appearance of the word "aliene" throughout
the text). A marked separation was made of each paragraph, and
catch words that immediately caught the eye were placed before each
paragraph of the revised text.
Dean Gavit has taken the Brown restatement without modification
in any particular and at the end of every chapter, except those purely
BOOK REVIEWS
historical, has added a commentary, designed to explain some of the
more technical portions of the law described by Blackstone and also to
indicate the development of the law in the United States since Black-
stone's time.
In this undertaking the author has achieved marked success, with
the result that in a book of 950 pages we have all that is presently valu-
able in the commentaries, with the clear, concise and comprehensive
notes of a scholar, by which with the glance of an eye the reader can
compare the law as Blackstone stated it with the law of today. The
comments are short, rarely extending beyond two or three pages; they
are of a broad character, free from any attempt to show the qualifica-
tions and limitations of the text, rendering citations of authority super-
erogatory.
The excellence of the performance can be illustrated by Dean Gavit's
statement of the struggle between the Civil and Common Law, pages 23
to 25, and his comments on the Common Law system, pages 57 to 59,
and on Courts in General, pages 538 to 540.
Necessarily, however, in a work of this sort, there will be some dif-
ferences as to what should be included or omitted in explaining the
present law. Thus, there are certain portions of the Blackstone text
that this reviewer considers of enough importance to require greater
notice. For example, Blackstone, dealing with the laws of England,
gives the Common Law rule that if a statute which repeals another is
itself repealed, the first statute is thereby revived.' No allusion is made
to that in the notes, but this rule has been changed by Federal statute
and by statutes in most of the States. Furthermore, the comment on
Chapter XVIII of the first book does not make clear that on the dis-
solution of a corporation its lands no longer revert to the grantor.
Also, there are statements in the comments which should be eluci-
dated for the benefit of the student; for example, the statement2 that
it has been settled in England that the power of Parliament is superior
to the Courts and that the latter do not assume or exercise the power
to declare an act of Parliament unconstitutional deserves qualification.
In England unconstitutional does not mean illegal but unconven-
tional. According to Creasy the English Constitution consists of writ-
ten documents from Magna Charta in 1215 to the Act of Settlement in
1690; whatever the source, and some are parliamentary acts, they
emanate from no place higher than Parliament and are always subject
to repeal or modification; like any other Act they are construed by the
Courts, the highest of which is one of the houses of Parliament. In
England the Courts proceed as do ours, but the question of constitu-
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tionality in our sense of the word can never arise because the Consti-
tution is of no greater authority than any other statute.
Corporations sole are very rare in the United States, perhaps obso-
lete except in New York and Massachusetts, and there are few points
of corporation law applicable to them, hence Dean Gavit's statement on
page 216 is open to objection.
The law as it relates to "base" or "qualified" fees remains in a state
of confusion and incertitude. Blackstone states and illustrates what he
means by "base" or "qualified" fees on page 274; writers and Courts
have come to classify these fees as "determinable" fees or, as the Re-
statement designates them, "fee simple determinables." This change
in nomenclature has added to the confusion, especially in reading Black-
stone who does not mention "determinable" fees in his book, hence when
Dean Gavit says on page 282 that "qualified" or "base" fees and so-
called conditional fees do with earlier concepts of the law and have been
rather uniformly repudiated in this country and thereafter on page 330
states "determinable" fees are still recognized in our law, the reader is
confused. "Base" fees have had a very interesting history in North
Carolina, and the reader is referred to Prof. McCall's article, "Estates
on Condition and on Special Limitation in North Carolina."3
The statement on page 695 that a Grand Jury is normally limited to
six jurors must be an inadvertence. The term Grand Jury was applied
because that jury was constituted of a greater number than the usual
jury of twelve. If any jurisdiction in the country has a Grand Jury of
six members it must be exceptional.
To the law student who feels that to be a cultured lawyer he must
know something of Blackstone, to the lover of our literature and insti-
tutions who wishes to broaden his historical background, this book is
most strongly recommended. Indeed, this edition in one respect is
-superior to the previous ones, because the reader is given the Black-
stone text in a concise manner and his attention is not beguiled by the
silken style of the writer.
To the practitioner, the book may supplement but will not substi-
tute for former editions. The lawyer is too cautious to quote from an
author whose work has been greatly abbreviated and whose language
has been altered; changes in the law he will desire supported by cita-
tions; from his point of view the work has an additional drawback,
the paging of the original edition is not contained in this one, with the
result that time and labor are consumed when a comparison of the two
is sought.
The type is clear and easy to read, and hardly an error is noted in
the proof reading. A biography of Blackstone, a list of common law
3 19 N. C. L Rsv. 334.
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maxims, a glossary of law terms and withal a splendid index add to the
value of the work.
KINGSLAND VAN WINKLE.
Asheville, North Carolina.
Trusts in the Conflict of Laws. By Walter W. Land. New York:
Baker, Voorhees & Co. 1940. Pp. xxix, 440. $6.00.
For the attorney whose practice involves any considerable concern
with trusts, testamentary and inter vivos, this volume should be of very
real value. It would be important if it served only to make him aware
of the risks which the trust must run when it steps outside the bounds
of a single state. Differences in laws determining the validity of trusts
are sufficiently numerous to constitute serious hazards, but to these must
be added differences in rules relating to interpretation and construction
and to administration. Moreover, security is not achieved by the
domestic character of the trust at the time the trust instrument is
drafted or even when it becomes bperative. Most tru sts are long-term
transactions; in the interval between a trust's conception and its ex-
tinction, testators, beneficiaries, and trustees may change their domicils,
the situs of the trust property may shift, and statutory change may
introduce conflicts of law in time to complicate pre-existing conflicts of
law in space. Finally, trusts which are not wholly domestic to a single
state present the ominous possibility of double taxation.
Mr. Land has brought together the American -cases which treat of
these problems.1 Of the more than 400 pages of text, approximately
275 deal with the Conflict of Laws, the remainder with problems under
estate, inheritance, property and income taxes. The convenience value
of such a collation of material is high, as anyone who has had occasion
for research in the field of Conflicts knows too well. Moreover, Mr.
Land seems to have been thorough in his research and to write thought-
fully and lucidly concerning the cases. His work is open only to a
single criticism of major consequence, and the deficiency is one which
the author I suspect regards as inherent in his subject.
The shortcoming which I find in Mr. Land's treatment of many of
the problems with which he deals is that, although he depicts numerous
points at which Conflicts decisions are in conflict or in confusion, he
offers limited aid in resolving these difficulties. On occasion, to be
sure, he expresses his own preference for one or another rule, but it
is not often that he carries the reader beyond the point at which the
decisions of the courts asserting that rule have left him.
So long as Conflicts rules could be regarded as imperatives flowing
'Their number is surprisingly high. Approximately 450 cases are listed in the
Table of Cases.
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logically from the territorial nature of law-so long, for example, as
one could accept unquestioningly the proposition that the law of the
situs was the only conceivable law to create interests in property-then
search for reasons to illumine and fortify the conclusions dictated by
the system was uncalled for. But Mr. Land does not subscribe to any
such system; he recognizes that courts in the cases which he has ex-
amined have often been moved by considerations which, though fre-
quently left inarticulate, seem quite foreign to a territorial-cum-vested-
rights theory of Conflict of Laws. Unfortunately, he has not provided
his readers an adequate substitute for the dogma which he rejects.
At several points Mr. Land concludes that courts seem to have
applied the law with which a trust has had the most substantial contact.
He lists the various "contacts" which have been factors in decision,
but observes with regret that the courts have not evaluated the factors
which they have employed.2 His criticism is well taken, and it is one
which could be extended beyond the trusts decisions and, indeed, be-
yond the reported cases to the commentary upon them. Yet the court's
failure calls for the commentator to attempt the task.
Perhaps the task cannot be performed. Certainly one cannot con-
struct the counterpart of the table of atomic weights out of the thirteen
factors which have been considered in determining the law to govern
the administration of testamentary trusts of personalty3 Perhaps even
a crude hierarchy is impracticable. Perhaps, too, the considerations
predominant in the decisions are not to be found among the factors at
all. But if this should be the case, what does and should control?
Many New York decisions on validity, as Mr. Land makes clear, are
controlled not by "factors" but by the desire to sustain trusts against
attack based upon the peculiar New York rules concerning restraints.
Perhaps, if one could get behind the characteristically opaque opinions
in this field, comparable controls would be found operating in areas
where confusion and conflict seem to predominate.
For the attorney, such inquiries might be revealing when his con-
cern is prompted by litigation, especially on the appellate level. Where,
however, he is engaged in the creation of trusts, he must work to min-
imize not only taxes but the hazards of* legal uncertainties. In this
undertaking, he will be well advised to heed the numerous suggestions
'For example, at p. 206, the author observes, "If in fact the decisions are
based upon a combination of factors. rather than on one single element, one faced
with the problem of choice of the governing law would like to know what ele-
ments of the trust the courts consider in making their choice. He would also
like to know the relative weights given by the courts to the various factual con-
nections, and whether or not the particular problem of administration has any
effect upon what law governs. . . . On all of those questions one receives little
guidance from the rules formulated in the past."
3Pp. 210-213.
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which Mr. Land has provided for the planning of trusts from the
standpoint of conflicting laws.
DAVID F. CAVERS.
Duke University School of Law.
The Administration of Federal Work Relief. By Arthur W. Mac-
malion, John D. Millett, and Gladys Ogden. Chicago: Public Ad-
ministration Service. 1941. Pp. ix, 407. $3.75.
'Behind this unimposing title lies one of the most significant projects
in governmental research to be undertaken in recent years. Its point
of departure was the unfortunate fact that no record has been made
of the evolution of the administrative agencies set up during the national
emergency of 1917. Such a record would have been invaluable to the
men who were facing the same problems, traveling the same paths, and
making the same mistakes in setting up relief agencies during the de-
pression years, and the Public Administration Committee of the Social
Science Research Council resolved that when the next emergency arose,
the lessons of the depression years would not be wasted. With the
entrance of the United States into World War II, the record and the
new emergency have arrived simultaneously.
Within a month of the passage of the first Emergency Relief Ap-
propriation Act, the Council commissioned Professor Macmahon of
Columbia University to "capture and record" the evolution of the Fed-
eral work relief program. He was later joined by Miss Ogden and
Mr. Millett, and for a year and a half, until late in 1937, these three were
permitted to sit in governmental offices as observers, to talk over ad-
ministrative problems with the leading figures, and to go through files
of correspondence and records, in Washington, New York, and seven-
teen other states. In 1940 Mr. Millet returned to Washington to sur-
vey the changes in organization and policy since 1937, and he and
Professor Macmahon prepared this study from a three thousand page
summary of notes and papers made by Miss Ogden.
The flexibility of the Federal work relief program has amounted at
times to amorphousness. Senator Vandenburg called it "a mystery,
born in the dark." It is one of the contributions of the present authors
that they not only trace the changes but point out why they were neces-
sary, and why certain relationships that were vague were meant to be
vague. As an example of their method, they point out that the Works
Progress Administration appeared first in an Executive Order as an
agency to review the progress of the program and report to the Pres-
ident. Only incidentally was it empowered to "recommend and carry
on small useful projects designed to assure a maximum of employment
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in all localities." It was assumed that the Public Works Administration
would continue to furnish most of the employment. The line of de-
marcation between WPA and PWA projects was never clearly drawn.
There were two reasons for this: one, that Secretary Ickes was pre-
pared to resign if the PWA were pushed into the background; the
other, that the President did not wish to destroy the rivalry between
Ickes and Hopkins even if he could have done so. The President has
always hesitated to make choices between men. The growth of WPA
to the dominant position was thus left to time and to the potent fact
that because of the higher ratio of material costs to labor costs in PWA
projects, it was four times as expensive to keep a man at work on PWA
as on WPA.
In this fashion, combining objective research and personal observa-
tion, the story of federal work relief is unfolded from the shadowy
beginnings of the plan and the initial legislation to the launching of the
program in the last months of 1935. The administrative organization
during this period is analyzed in detail, including the various divisions
centered around the President and such adjuncts as the Resettlement
Administration, the REA, the NYA, and the CCC. Later develop-
ments are summarized, the WPA is given special attention, and a final
section deals with the relationship of the WPA to other Federal agencies
and to state and local governments. Of special interest to the student
of law is the account of work relief legislation and the analysis of the
role of the Comptroller General in reviewing the legality of specific
projects.
Competent and important as are the conclusions of Professor Mac-
mahon and his associates, space will permit of no more than his final
statement, particularly significant because of the crisis which world
affairs have thrust upon our government since it was written:
"Administratively, the experience of the works program pointed to
the following prerequisites for success in large-scale governmental
efforts: a clear delegation of the main responsibility, made possible by
thorough initial planning; periodic reassessment at the center; and the
enforcement of interagency relationships. All these prerequisites must
be realized in the President's name without undue encroachment upon
the President's personal attention. . . . But the mechanics of admin-
istrative action will not yield the full substantive results desired unless
there is also public recognition and avowal of the scope and duration
of the problem at hand."
SAMRAY SMITH.
Staff Member, Institute of Government,
Chapel Hill, N. C.
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